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WHEN THE UNITED STATES LOSES IN A CRIMINAL 
CASE: THE GOVERNMENT APPEAL PROCESS 
Margaret D. McGaughey* 
I. INTRODUCTION
If a criminal defendant has been found not guilty after trial, 
the United States has no right of appeal because the Double 
Jeopardy Clause precludes trying a defendant a second time on 
the same charges.1 For the same reason, the United States has no 
right to appeal a ruling made during trial, even if it is patently 
wrong.
Three statutes, however, authorize appeals by the United 
States in criminal cases under limited circumstances: 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3731, 18 U.S.C. § 3742(b), and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. In addition, 
the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure provide means by 
which the United States can seek further review of an adverse 
decision of a federal court of appeals.2
Although the United States Attorneys for the ninety-four 
federal districts are allowed to make many choices concerning 
criminal prosecutions themselves, the same is not true of the 
decision to exercise the limited authority to appeal or to seek 
further review of a loss in one of the federal courts of appeals. 
Rather, there is an extensive internal Department of Justice 
*The former Appellate Chief of the United States Attorney’s Office for the District of 
Maine, Ms. McGaughey has handled 450 criminal appeals in the United States Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit. 
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 2 (providing that no person shall “be subject for the same 
offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb”). 
2. This article will not address mandamus, which is a drastic remedy that is aimed at 
confining a lower court to the exercise of its jurisdiction or compelling a court to exercise 
its authority when it has a duty to do so. E.g., Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 426 U.S. 394, 402 
(1976) (citing Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 95 (1967)). Mandamus is not available 
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process for obtaining authorization to pursue those remedies that 
only the Solicitor General of the United States can grant. This 
process can—and occasionally does—lead to disagreement 
among the relevant US Attorney’s office, that office’s 
counterpart in the Criminal Appellate Division of the 
Department of Justice (DOJ), the Office of the Solicitor General 
(OSG), or all three. The result is that appeals by the United 
States and further appellate review of government losses in 
criminal cases are relatively rare. 
II. STATUTORY AUTHORIZATION FOR AN APPEAL BY THE UNITED
STATES FROM A DECISION IN THE DISTRICT COURT
A. 18 U.S.C. § 3731 
The principal vehicle for the United States to appeal an 
adverse decision of a district court is 18 U.S.C. § 3731.3 That 
statute authorizes government appeals of three types of rulings. 
The first is an order dismissing an indictment or information.4
3. The statute reads as follows:  
In a criminal case an appeal by the United States shall lie to a court of appeals 
from a decision, judgment, or order of a district court dismissing an indictment 
or information or granting a new trial after verdict or judgment, as to any one or 
more counts, or any part thereof, except that no appeal shall lie where the double 
jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution prohibits further prosecution. 
An appeal by the United States shall lie to a court of appeals from a decision or 
order of a district court suppressing or excluding evidence or requiring the return 
of seized property in a criminal proceeding, not made after the defendant has 
been put in jeopardy and before the verdict or finding on an indictment or 
information, if the United States attorney certifies to the district court that the 
appeal is not taken for purpose of delay and that the evidence is a substantial 
proof of a fact material in the proceeding. 
An appeal by the United States shall lie to a court of appeals from a decision or 
order, entered by a district court of the United States, granting the release of a 
person charged with or convicted of an offense, or denying a motion for 
revocation of, or modification of the conditions of, a decision or order granting 
release.
18 U.S.C. § 3731 (2012) (available at uscode.house.gov). 
4. An information is a charging instrument filed by the US Attorney if a defendant 
waives the right to be prosecuted by an indictment returned by a grand jury. FED. R. CRIM.
P. 7(b) (requiring waiver to be made “in open court and after [the defendant’s] being 
advised of the nature of the charge and of the defendant’s rights”). Like an indictment, the 
information “must be a plain, concise, and definite written statement of the essential facts 
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By statute, that option is available only if there are no double 
jeopardy consequences.5 It is generally understood that jeopardy 
attaches once the jury is empaneled and sworn.6 As a result, 
federal prosecutors endeavor to have dismissal motions decided 
well in advance of trial. For a time, some judges who feared 
being reversed would frustrate the government appeal process 
by ruling on a potentially appealable motion only after the jury 
had been chosen. That timing divested the United States of its 
statutory right to appeal. It now appears to be settled law that 
although a trial court may not have an absolute duty to decide a 
motion encompassed by § 3731 before trial begins, it should do 
so.7 Double jeopardy concerns are not implicated by an appeal 
of a dismissal order entered before trial because if the United 
States prevails, the indictment or information is simply 
reinstated and the case proceeds to trial in the ordinary course.8
A second type of appeal that § 3731 allows is from an order 
granting a new trial after verdict or judgment. In this instance as 
well, there are no double jeopardy implications because if the 
United States succeeds, the court of appeals merely reinstates 
the verdict or judgment.9 A complication with respect to appeals 
of new trial orders arises in cases that are resolved by means of a 
bench trial, where a judge, not a jury, decides the issue of a 
defendant’s factual guilt or innocence. A judgment of acquittal 
that follows a bench trial is the same as a verdict of acquittal 
5. United States v. Szpyt, 785 F.3d 31 (1st Cir. 2015) (discussing double jeopardy bar, 
but concluding that it did not apply). 
6. Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 36 (1978) (confirming, after review of earlier cases, that 
“jeopardy attaches when the jury is empaneled and sworn”).  
7. United States v. Barletta, 644 F.2d 50, 59 (1st Cir. 1981) (concluding that “once a 
district court has decided that a motion may be raised prior to trial . . . that an issue is 
sufficiently ‘capable of determination without the trial of the general issue’ it may then find 
no ‘good cause’ for deferring a ruling . . . , since to do so would adversely affect the 
government’s right to appeal under § 3731,” but also recognizing that “it is relatively 
unusual to empower a party to compel a district court to act,” and “emphasiz[ing] the 
significant limitations that this holding places upon the government’s ability to require a 
pretrial ruling”).  
8. United States v. Carter, 860 F.3d 39, 40 (1st Cir. 2017) (noting that case involved “a 
conviction, a vacation of that conviction on appeal, a dismissal of the indictment on 
remand, a government appeal of that dismissal, and the subsequent issuance of controlling 
authority making it clear that the original conviction was proper”).  
9. United States v. Coleman, 811 F.2d 804, 808 (3d Cir. 1987) (“Having determined 
that appellee Coleman’s motion for a new trial was out of time, we reverse the district 
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after a jury trial: it cannot be appealed.10 A judge who 
appreciates that a ruling against the United States might be 
subject to question will hold true to the responsibility not to 
frustrate the government’s statutory right to appeal. Rather than 
simply find the defendant not guilty, the judge will enter a 
finding of guilty, but then grant a new trial so that the 
questionable ruling may be appealed. If the post-trial order is 
reversed, the verdict of guilty can be reinstated, with the result 
that there are no further proceedings on the question of guilt or 
innocence, and the defendant is not placed in jeopardy a second 
time. 
Section 3731 also permits an appeal by the United States of 
an order granting a motion to suppress or exclude evidence or 
requiring the return of seized property in a criminal case. A 
§ 3731 appeal is available to challenge not only traditional 
suppression orders, but also pretrial orders granting motions in 
limine, which seek a ruling in advance of trial as to whether, for 
example, other-bad-acts evidence will be admitted pursuant to 
Rules 404(b) and 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.11
Consistent with the statute, suppression or exclusion orders, like 
orders dismissing indictments, are appealable only before the 
defendant has been placed in jeopardy and thus must be entered 
before the jury is sworn. By statute, this third type of appeal also 
requires the US Attorney to make two certifications to the 
district court: “that the appeal is not taken for purpose of delay 
and that the evidence is a substantial proof of a fact material in 
the proceeding.”12 The purpose of the certification requirements 
is to ensure that the prosecutor has carefully analyzed the case 
before deciding to appeal.13 Although the late filing of the 
certifications will not defeat appellate jurisdiction, it does permit 
10. United States v. Hunt, 212 F.3d 539, 543 (10th Cir. 2000) (recognizing as “well-
settled” rule indicating that “the Double Jeopardy Clause bars some government appeals,” 
and quoting United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 91 (1978) (“A judgment of acquittal, 
whether based on a jury verdict of not guilty or on a ruling by the court that the evidence is 
insufficient to convict, may not be appealed and terminates the prosecution when a second 
trial would be necessitated by a reversal.”)).  
11. United States v. Decines, 808 F.3d 785, 790 (9th Cir. 2015).  
12. 18 U.S.C. § 3731. 
13. United States v. Salisbury, 158 F.3d 1204, 1207 (11th Cir. 1998) (noting that “the 
purpose of the certification process is defeated when the prosecutor files her representation 
after initiating the appeal” and announcing that government appeals certified only after 
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the court of appeals to exercise its discretion to dismiss the 
appeal pursuant to Rule 3(a).14 Thus, as a matter of precaution, 
and consistent with the rulings of most courts that the 
certifications are a prerequisite to a government appeal, federal 
prosecutors take a variety of steps to conform to the statutory 
requirement.15
Finally, § 3731 allows the United States to appeal an order 
releasing a person following conviction or refusing to revoke or 
modify the conditions of release. Release orders within the 
purview of this provision refer to “a temporary period when a 
criminal defendant is permitted to remain free from detention 
while awaiting trial, sentencing, or appeal.”16 Section 3731 does 
not encompass revocation of probation (an alternative to 
imprisonment)17 or revocation of supervised release (a form of 
conditional liberty that follows completion of a prison term).18
Statutory authorization to appeal release orders operates to 
vindicate the public’s interest in ensuring that the conditions of 
temporary liberty while awaiting trial, sentencing, or appeal are 
sufficient to prevent a defendant from fleeing or committing 
14. United States v. Romaszko, 253 F.3d 757, 760 (2d Cir. 2001) (referring to Fed. R. 
App. P. 3(a)). 
15. See, e.g., United States v. McNeil, 484 F.3d 301, 308–09 (4th Cir. 2007) (setting out 
one US Attorney’s efforts to regularize office procedures for filing certifications, opining 
that in cases to come “the certification must be filed with the notice of appeal,” so that “the 
government will have determined that the appeal is warranted under § 3731 before 
disrupting the trial process by noticing an appeal,” and noting that “other courts . . . have 
imposed a similar requirement” (citations omitted)); United States v. Smith, 263 F.3d 571, 
578 (6th Cir. 2001) (noting that delayed filing is “disfavored” and characterizing “failure to 
timely file a certificate” as “an irregularity in perfecting the appeal”); Romaszko, 253 F.3d 
at 760 (noting that the Solicitor General had authorized the appeal, which “likely ensure[d] 
that the purposes of section 3731 were met,” and  also noting that “there does not appear to 
be any prejudice resulting from the belated filing”); United States v. Bailey, 136 F.3d 1160, 
1163–64 (7th Cir. 1998) (recognizing that the “prosecution engaged in a reasoned pre-
appeal analysis” and concluding that exercise of discretion to proceed to a decision on the 
merits was warranted). Many US Attorney’s offices include the certification in the notice 
of appeal itself. An added safeguard, which is the practice in the office with which the 
author was associated, is to file the notice of appeal from the US Attorney’s electronic 
filing account. 
16. United States v. Peterson, 394 F.3d 98, 102 (2d Cir. 2005).  
17. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3561–3564 (2012) (available at uscode.house.gov). 
18. Supervised release, which replaced special parole, is governed by 18 U.S.C. §3583. 
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further crimes.19 In part, authorization for the government to 
appeal release orders reflects the statutory presumption against 
bail pending appeal that is reinforced by case precedents.20 In 
this last type of § 3731 appeal there is no double jeopardy 
concern because there is no trial on the merits of the underlying 
criminal charge. 
B. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(b). 
A second statute that authorizes an appeal by the United 
States is 18 U.S.C. § 3742(b).21 The circumstances under which 
the United States can appeal under this provision are the inverse 
of those in which the defendant is permitted to appeal under 
subsection (a) of the same statute, with one exception.22 First, a 
government appeal is authorized if the sentence was imposed in 
19. Cf. United States v. Delker, 757 F.2d 1390, 1391–93 (3d Cir. 1985) (discussing 
defendant’s past conduct and then-new Bail Reform Act’s broad focus on dangers in 
addition to physical violence and its broad aim of ensuring community-wide safety). 
20. E.g., United States v. Chilingrian, 280 F.3d 704, 709 (6th Cir. 2000) 
(acknowledging that Bail Reform Act “creates a presumption against release pending 
appeal” (citing United States v. Vance, 851 F.2d 166, 168 (6th Cir. 1988)). 
21. That statute reads: 
(b) Appeal by the Government.—The Government may file a notice of appeal in 
the district court for review of an otherwise final sentence if the sentence— 
(1) was imposed in violation of law; 
(2) was imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the sentencing 
guidelines;
(3) is less than the sentence specified in the applicable guideline range to 
the extent that the sentence includes a lesser fine or term of 
imprisonment, probation, or supervised release than the minimum 
established in the guideline range, or includes a less limiting condition 
of probation or supervised release . . . than the minimum established 
in the guideline range; or 
(4) was imposed for an offense for which there is no sentencing guideline 
and is plainly unreasonable. 
The Government may not further prosecute such appeal without the personal 
approval of the Attorney General, the Solicitor General, or a deputy solicitor 
general designated by the Solicitor General. 
18 U.S.C. § 3742(b) (2012) (available at uscode.house.gov) (footnote omitted). 
22.  Subsection 18 U.S.C. § 3742(b)(3) provides the one ground for an appeal by the 
United States that does not track a ground for appeal appearing in § 3742(a). Instead, its 
analogue is 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(3) (allowing defendant’s appeal when sentence imposed 
“includes a greater fine or term of imprisonment, probation, or supervised release than the 
maximum established in the guideline range, or includes a more limiting condition of 
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violation of law—for example, it was below a mandatory 
minimum term required by such statutes as 18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(e)(1), which addresses firearms offenses, or 21 U.S.C. 
§ 841(b), which concerns drug offenses.23 Second, the United 
States can appeal a sentence that was imposed as a result of an 
incorrect application of the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines,24 which might occur if, for example, a sentencing 
judge refused to impose a guideline enhancement.25 The third 
type of § 3742(b) appeal by the United States is of a sentence 
that was below the guideline range, whether achieved by a 
downward departure or a downward variance.26 Finally, the 
United States can appeal a sentence that was imposed for a 
crime for which there is no guideline range and the sentence is 
patently unreasonable.27 Section 3742(b) specifically provides 
that the government needs the “personal approval of the 
Attorney General, the Solicitor General, or a deputy solicitor 
general designated by the Solicitor General” when undertaking 
an appeal.28 Before the Supreme Court’s decision in United
States v. Booker29 made the Sentencing Guidelines advisory  
instead of mandatory, § 3742(b) appeals by the United States 
were somewhat common. After Booker, however, sentencing 
judges have significantly greater discretion in the choice of 
penalty, and the number of government sentencing appeals has 
diminished markedly. 
23. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(b)(1). 
24. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(b)(2).  
25. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3C1.1 (2016) (directing 
enhancement of sentence for a defendant who has obstructed justice by such means as 
lying under oath). 
26. A departure is a deviation from the Guideline range of sentences that the Sentencing 
Guidelines specifically authorize. A variance is an increase or decrease from the guideline 
range that is based on a wider range of factors. United States v. Robinson, 454 F.3d 839, 
842 (8th Cir. 2006) (recognizing that “departures and . . . ‘variances’ are not the same,” 
that “the Guidelines are just one of the . . . factors to be considered in determining a 
reasonable sentence,” that some “cases that would not justify a departure under the 
Guidelines . . . are appropriate for a variance,” and that, in others, “a Guidelines departure 
and other . . . factors may produce a lower reasonable sentence than a departure alone”). 
27. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(b)(4). 
28. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(b). 
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C. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 Appeals from Grants of Habeas Corpus 
Finally, the United States is permitted to appeal an order 
granting habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which 
offers the defendant a means of attacking the sentence, but, 
technically, not the underlying conviction.30 Although § 2255 
petitions arise from criminal cases, they are hybrid proceedings 
that in some respects are treated as civil actions.31 Thus, the 
grant of habeas relief can be appealed pursuant to the final 
judgment rule of 28 U.S.C. § 1291.32 There are no double 
jeopardy problems with respect to this category of appeal 
because if the order granting habeas relief is reversed, the 
judgment and sentence are reinstated and there are no further 
proceedings with regard to guilt or innocence. 
In prior years, appeals by the United States of § 2255 
decisions were very rare because most petitions are filed by pro 
se litigants who raise ineffective-assistance claims against their 
trial or appellate lawyers, or sometimes both. To prevail on this 
type of challenge, the petitioner has the two-part burden of 
proving first that the lawyer’s performance fell below the 
standard of proficiency that is generally accepted in the 
profession.33 In addition, the petitioner must show that but for 
the deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding would 
have been different.34 This means that the challenger must show 
30. The statute provides that 
[a] prisoner in custody . . . claiming the right to be released upon the ground that 
the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United 
States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that 
the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise 
subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence to 
vacate, set aside or correct the sentence. 
28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (2012) (available at uscode.house.gov). It provides further that “[a]n 
appeal may be taken to the court of appeals from the order entered on the motion as from a 
final judgment on application for a writ of habeas corpus.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(d). 
31. United States v. Sampson, 58 F. Supp. 3d 136, 147 (D. Mass. 2012) (noting that 
“[a]rguably, § 2255 proceedings are hybrids, which in some contexts should be considered 
criminal actions and in other contexts should be considered civil actions”). 
32. The statute provides that the federal courts of appeals “shall have jurisdiction of 
appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States . . . except where a 
direct review may be had in the Supreme Court.” 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012) (available at 
uscode.house.gov). 
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a reasonable probability that, for example, he would not have 
pleaded guilty, he would not have been convicted after trial, he 
would have received a lower sentence, or the conviction would 
have been reversed on appeal. That demanding standard 
generally immunizes lawyers’ conduct from hindsight second-
guessing, especially insofar as tactical decisions are concerned.35
In the past, pro se § 2255 challengers seldom prevailed, so there 
was nothing for the United States to appeal. A series of Supreme 
Court decisions involving the Armed Career Criminal Act 
(ACCA)36 changed that. 
The ACCA requires a mandatory minimum sentence of 
fifteen years for any defendant who has been convicted of a 
qualifying firearms offense and has previously been convicted at 
least three times of a “violent felony,” a “serious drug offense,” 
or a combination of the two. The Supreme Court ruled in 2010 
that to amount to a felony that is “violent,” a crime must require 
proof of the use of force that is “capable of causing physical 
pain or injury to another person.”37 Five years later, the Supreme 
Court held that the so-called “residual clause” of the ACCA, 
which deemed a crime to be violent if it “involves conduct that 
presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another,” 
was void for vagueness.38 The Court did not then “call into 
question the application of the Act to the four enumerated 
offenses, or the remainder of the Act’s definition of a violent 
felony.”39 Thus, a crime can still qualify as violent if it “has as 
an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical 
35. Id. at 689 (referring to the “constitutionally protected independence of counsel” and 
the danger of restricting “the wide latitude counsel must have in making tactical 
decisions”).
36. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2012) (setting out enhanced fines and minimum prison 
terms, and prohibiting suspended or probationary sentences for those who have three prior 
convictions for violent felonies or serious drug offenses) (available at uscode.house.gov). 
37. Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 140 (2010) [hereinafter Johnson I]. 
38. Johnson v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2557 (2015) (opining that 
“the indeterminacy of the wide-ranging inquiry required by the residual clause both denies 
fair notice to defendants and invites arbitrary enforcement by judges” and that 
“[i]ncreasing a defendant’s sentence under the clause denies due process of law,” and 
acknowledging that “[t]wo features of the residual clause conspire to make it 
unconstitutionally vague”) [hereinafter Johnson II]. 
39. Id. at 2563 (referring to burglary, arson, extortion, and use of explosives, all 
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force against the person of another”40 or is, categorically, 
burglary, arson, or extortion, or involves the use of explosives.41
In Descamps,42 and Mathis,43 the Supreme Court added two 
more twists. Descamps requires analysis of whether a statue is 
“divisible” in that it “sets out one or more elements of the 
offense in the alternative.”44 A statute is “indivisible” if the 
various ways of violating it cannot be separated from each other. 
Thus, for an “indivisible” statute to punish a crime that can be 
considered an ACCA predicate, all ways of violating it must 
qualify. By contrast, if a statute is “divisible,” sentencing courts 
may apply a “modified categorical approach” that permits them 
to consult a limited category of court documents to determine 
whether the crime satisfies the ACCA’s definition.45 With 
“divisible” statutes, there is the additional issue of whether the 
different ways of committing the crime amount to “elements” or 
are instead “means.”46 “Elements” are “‘constituent parts’ of a 
crime’s legal definition—the things the ‘prosecution must prove 
to sustain a conviction.’”47 By contrast, “means” are the 
“underlying brute facts” of “[h]ow a given defendant actually 
perpetrated the crime.”48 If the differences in the ways a statute 
can be violated are not “elements,” but “means,” courts cannot 
apply a “modified categorical approach.”49 Rather, they are 
limited to evaluating the statutory definition of the crime as 
interpreted by the relevant state’s highest appellate court, a 
federal court of appeals, or the Supreme Court. 
As a result of those decisions, US Attorney’s Offices 
around the country have been flooded with § 2255 challenges to 
ACCA sentences. Most of the ACCA predicates are violations 
of state law, which means there are countless variations in the 
elements, means, and mens rea requirements needed for a 
conviction. Faced with statutes that may or may not be 
40. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i). 
41. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). 
42. Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2015). 
43. Mathis v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016). 
44. Descamps, 570 U.S. at 257.
45. Id.
46. Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2248. 
47. Id. (citation omitted). 
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“divisible,” and the uncertainty as to whether the differences are 
“elements” or “means,” federal prosecutors began trolling court 
records in an effort to establish the precise nature of prior 
convictions by reference to charging instruments, plea 
colloquies, judgments, or the other approved court records.50
The question is not what the defendant actually did, but instead 
what the elements of the crime of conviction are.51 Thus, 
complaints or the account of a prior crime that is contained in a 
presentence report do not suffice.52 In many instances, the 
necessary court records have long since been destroyed. Equally 
often, the relevant statutes—those in force when the defendant 
was charged and convicted—have undergone many revisions 
and the applicable version can pre-date the materials available in 
research databases like Westlaw or be difficult to obtain for 
other reasons. Thus, unlike upholding Sixth Amendment claims, 
which ordinarily can be defended on the existing or expanded 
record, upholding ACCA sentences can be quite challenging. 
Perhaps sharing the public’s considerable criticism of 
mandatory minimum sentences,53 district courts around the 
country began granting § 2255 relief from ACCA sentences in 
light of the Johnson I-Johnson II-Descamps-Mathis line of 
cases. To the general public, the logic of these decisions can—
and probably does—seem counter-intuitive. Among the crimes 
that courts have ruled do not qualify as “violent felonies” are 
armed robbery,54 aggravated assault,55 and resisting arrest.56
Because of their impact on law enforcement across the nation, 
those decisions became prime candidates for government 
appeals. There was also substantial concern that the logic of 
50. Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 16 (2005) (holding that “a later court 
determining the character of an admitted burglary is generally limited to examining the 
statutory definition, charging document, written plea agreement, transcript of plea 
colloquy, and any explicit factual finding by the trial judge to which the defendant 
assented” and that courts should not look to “police reports” and “complaint applications”). 
51. Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2248.
52. Shepard, 544 U.S. at 16. 
53. See, e.g., Steven Nauman, Note, Brown v. Plata: Renewing the Call to End 
Mandatory Sentences, 65 FLA. L. REV. 855, 866–68 (2013) (recounting illustrative 
mandatory-sentencing “horror stories” and referring to “countless victims” who are serving 
“ridiculous and unjust” mandatory sentences).
54. United States v. Parnell, 818 F.3d 974, 978 (9th Cir. 2016). 
55. United States v. McMurray, 653 F.3d 367, 374–76 (6th Cir. 2011). 
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Johnson II, which invalidated the ACCA’s “residual clause,” 
would be extended to the Sentencing Guidelines, which define 
the analogous term “crime of violence” in language almost 
identical to the ACCA definition of “violent felony” and, until a 
recent revision, contained a “residual clause” that was worded 
identically to the ACCA definition that Johnson II invalidated.57
The result is that the requests by the United States for 
authorization to appeal § 2255 rulings have skyrocketed. 
III. FURTHER APPELLATE REVIEW
When the United States loses in a federal court of appeals, 
it has three options. The first is a petition for panel rehearing, 
which is the only remedy for an appellate loss in a criminal case 
that a US Attorney’s office can pursue without authorization 
from the Solicitor General. Petitions for panel rehearing seldom 
succeed. 
The second option in the case of a lost appeal is the petition 
for rehearing en banc, which is not favored, and like the petition 
for panel rehearing, is seldom granted.58 If one is to be pursued, 
the US Attorney’s office that handled the case in the court of 
appeals files the Rule 35 petition. However, that office is 
authorized to go forward with en banc review only if it obtains 
the permission of the OSG. This is true even though the United 
States frequently combines in the same pleading a petition for 
panel rehearing (which needs no permission) and a suggestion 
for rehearing en banc (which requires permission). 
A final form of further appellate review is petitioning the 
Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of certiorari. 
These petitions can be filed only by the OSG. They, too, are 
57. Compare U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2(a) (2016) (providing 
that “[t]he term ‘crime of violence’ means any offense under federal or state law, 
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that . . . has as an element the 
use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another”) with    
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2(a) (2015) (providing that “[t]he term 
‘crime of violence’ means any offense under federal or state law, punishable by 
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that . . . has as an element the use, attempted 
use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another or . . . otherwise 
involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another). 
58. FED. R. APP. P. 35(a) (providing that rehearing en banc is “not favored and 
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rarely successful. As pertains to the United States as a litigant, 
certiorari relief is available if one federal court of appeals has 
entered a decision that conflicts with the decision of another on 
“the same important matter” or its decision has “so far departed 
from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings” that 
review by the Supreme Court in the exercise of its supervisory 
powers is necessary.59 A writ of certiorari may also be sought if 
a federal court of appeals “has decided an important question of 
federal law that has not been, but should be” settled by the 
Supreme Court, or “has decided an important federal question in 
a way that conflicts with relevant decisions” of the Supreme 
Court.60 A writ of certiorari is generally reserved for questions 
of law. It is almost never granted when the asserted error is one 
of fact or misapplication of properly stated law.61
In very rare cases, a writ of certiorari can be invoked to 
review a case that is still pending in a federal court of appeals 
upon “a showing that the case is of such imperative public 
importance as to justify deviation from normal appellate 
practice” and requires the Supreme Court’s “immediate 
determination.”62 This procedure was followed in United States 
v. Fanfan,63 the companion to Booker, which fundamentally 
altered the role of the Sentencing Guidelines. Although US 
Attorney’s offices can and do make recommendations with 
respect to certiorari petitions, the OSG has exclusive 
responsibility for any case that reaches the certiorari stage or 
goes to briefing and argument before the Supreme Court. 
IV. THE AUTHORIZATION PROCESS
What is known to federal prosecutors as the adverse-
decision process applies to losses by the United States in both 
the federal district courts and the federal courts of appeals. On 
one hand, this process has the benefits of bringing many minds 
to bear on significant issues of law and securing uniformity of 
59. SUP. CT. R. 10(a). 
60. SUP. CT. R. 10(c). 
61. Id.
62. SUP. CT. R. 11.
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positions among the ninety-four federal districts. On the other 
hand, the process can produce frustrations for all concerned. 
Whenever a trial judge enters an order that by statute is 
appealable, the line Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) 
responsible for the case, or the office’s appellate specialist, if 
there is one, must prepare a memorandum recommending either 
that an appeal be taken or that there be no appeal. A similar 
memorandum is prepared whenever the United States loses a 
case in a federal court of appeals. A potential appeal or effort to 
seek further appellate review cannot be allowed to lapse simply 
because the US Attorney’s office has no interest in pursuing it. 
The US Attorney can, however, accelerate the decisionmaking 
process by notifying that office’s contact in the Appellate 
Section of the Criminal Division of the DOJ that the US 
Attorney does not recommend pursuing the case. A US 
Attorney’s Office is almost never required to take an appeal over 
its opposition. 
When the US Attorney’s Office recommends appeal, its 
memorandum gives a brief description of the case, identifies the 
issue or issues that could be appealed or considered en banc, 
supports the recommendation with case authorities, and explains 
why the case should be appealed. The reason for a 
recommendation of appeal will vary with the circumstances 
surrounding the case. A US Attorney’s office might want to 
appeal if, for example, the office has had an ongoing problem 
with a particular judge’s treatment of an issue, but that issue has 
never before arisen in an appealable posture. A second reason 
might be a conflict among the judges within a district on a legal 
question, because only the court of appeals can resolve that 
difference. A third consideration is the significance of the issue 
to the particular office—for example, the qualification of state-
law convictions from that district as ACCA predicates.64 By far 
64. The District of Maine, for example, has focused extensively on the statutory ban on 
firearms possession by persons who have been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of 
domestic violence. Issues regarding 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), which prohibits any person 
convicted of a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” from possessing a firearm, have 
landed in the Supreme Court twice—once in a case that originated in Maine after a 
domestic abuser was arrested for killing a baby bald eagle. Voisine v. United States, ___ 
U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 2272, 2277 (2016); see also United States v. Castleman, ___ U.S. ___, 
134 S. Ct. 1405 (2014) (arising in Tennessee and concerning a conviction for black-market 
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the weightiest factor, however, is the likelihood of success on 
appeal. 
United States Attorneys take appeal recommendations very 
seriously. They personally review them and often sign off on 
them only after considerable discussion and editing within the 
office. If the US Attorney agrees that an appeal is warranted, the 
memorandum is submitted with the pertinent papers (the 
indictment, ruling, and transcripts) to that office’s contact in the 
Appellate Section of the Criminal Division of the DOJ. Because 
each DOJ lawyer is assigned to a specific circuit, they and the 
AUSAs within that circuit deal with each other often. Line 
AUSAs look to their designated DOJ lawyers for assistance in 
avoiding or defending appeals and confer with their DOJ 
contacts before making any major concessions that they think 
are necessary in their pending cases. Even before submitting a 
memorandum, the line AUSA frequently alerts the assigned 
DOJ contact that an adverse decision has issued and a 
recommendation is coming. 
The line AUSA also carefully tracks the thirty-day period 
in which the United States may file a notice of appeal.65 AUSAs 
are encouraged not to file a notice of appeal too quickly because 
doing so causes the case to be docketed in the court of appeals 
and docketing triggers the running of deadlines. Reviewers at 
the various levels need time to evaluate a case. Delay in filing a 
notice of appeal also helps to save face for a US Attorney’s 
office. When the recommendation is against appeal, the adverse 
decision process can sometimes be completed before the notice 
of appeal is due. It can be better never to appeal at all than to file 
a notice of appeal only to dismiss it voluntarily. A district judge 
can mistake voluntary dismissal as a signal that an appeal was 
not authorized and conclude that the ruling at trial was therefore 
correct. 
A petition for rehearing en banc has a much shorter 
deadline: it must be filed within fourteen days of the entry of 
judgment.66 The practice with respect to these pleadings is to 
request extensions in the filing deadline until the review process 
can be completed. Although the federal courts of appeals are 
65. FED. R. APP. P. 4(b)(1)(B). 
66. FED. R. APP. P. 35(c) (referring to Rule 40 provision addressing petitions for 
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aware that the Solicitor General’s approval is required for en 
banc review, and know that approval can take weeks or even 
months to obtain, courts want to keep their dockets moving and 
so are reluctant to grant too many extension requests. 
On receiving the US Attorney’s recommendation, the DOJ 
Criminal Appellate attorney undertakes an independent 
evaluation of the case that considers the factors the US 
Attorney’s office has identified, but with an eye to nationwide 
consistency. One of the functions of the adverse-decision 
process is to prevent AUSAs in one district or circuit from 
taking positions that contradict the position of another US 
Attorney’s office somewhere else. Although the strength of the 
US Attorney’s recommendation that a case should be appealed 
or taken en banc carries weight with the DOJ lawyers, it does 
not carry the day. The DOJ lawyer’s memorandum identifies 
both additional arguments that support an appeal and those that 
could sound the death knell. While this first level of review is 
underway, the DOJ lawyer and line AUSA often communicate 
with each other informally to clarify points of fact or the record. 
The DOJ lawyer then writes a second memorandum that takes a 
position as to whether an appeal or further appellate review 
should be authorized. 
Whether the DOJ Criminal Appellate lawyer agrees with 
the US Attorney’s office or not, both sets of memoranda are 
forwarded to the OSG. There, an Assistant to the Solicitor 
General undertakes yet another independent review of the case 
and prepares yet another memorandum recommending for or 
against appeal. The same considerations that applied in the first 
two steps of the adverse-decision process are in play when the 
case gets to the OSG. At the OSG level, however, there can also 
be consideration of the prospect of review by the Supreme 
Court. Occasionally, OSG will have a special interest in an issue 
that is percolating through the courts around the country and will 
authorize an appeal in part for the purpose of attempting to 
create or intensify a split among the circuits. There are even 
cases in which the issue is so significant that OSG will initiate 
contact with US Attorney’s offices to find a case that can be 





      06/11/2018   08:46:58
40357-aap_18-2 Sheet No. 103 Side A      06/11/2018   08:46:58
MCGAUGHEYRESEND1 (DO NOT DELETE) 6/4/2018 3:20 PM 
THE GOVERNMENT APPEAL PROCESS 313
this strategy is Fanfan.67 In effort to bring the widespread 
differences among the circuits with respect to the Sentencing 
Guidelines to the Supreme Court’s prompt attention, the OSG 
and DOJ canvassed US Attorney’s Offices around the country 
for prospects, plucked Fanfan’s case from the First Circuit while 
it was still pending there, and took it directly to the Supreme 
Court. Such active involvement by OSG is, however, extremely 
rare. 
OSG generally authorizes appeals only if they hinge on 
questions of law, not questions of fact. Suppression rulings, 
especially those that pertain to evolving technological advances 
such as cellphones, are good candidates for government appeals 
or petitions for en banc review or certiorari.68 By contrast, 
although government sentencing appeals are allowed by statute, 
they often revolve around case-specific facts that have little or 
no legal importance. Unless a sentencing appeal relates to 
misapplication of a statute or addresses an issue concerning the 
Sentencing Guidelines generally,69 OSG is disinclined to pursue 
it. 
With respect to requests to seek further appellate review, a 
significant factor is whether the panel decision was unanimous 
or had a dissenting or concurring opinion. A split within a panel 
may suggest a division within the court as a whole. Another 
consideration for en banc review is whether the panel consisted 
only of regularly sitting members of the court or included a 
senior judge, a visiting judge from another circuit, or a district 
judge sitting by designation. An opinion that is authored or 
joined by a visitor can be viewed as more vulnerable than one 
decided by a panel consisting only of regular members of the 
court.70 The same is not true, however, of opinions written or 
67. See 543 U.S. at 229. 
68. See, e.g., Riley v. Cal., ___ U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014) (holding that neither 
interest in protecting officers’ safety nor interest in preventing destruction of evidence 
justified warrantless searches of cell phones). 
69. Beckles v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 137 S. Ct. 886 (2017), which addressed the 
question of whether the Sentencing Guidelines definition of “crime of violence” was 
unconstitutionally vague, was one such case. 
70. Cf. Jeffrey O. Cooper & Douglas A. Berman, Passive Virtues and Casual Vices in 
the Federal Courts of Appeals, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 685, 695–96 (2001) (noting that 
“judges from other circuits . . . may have less knowledge of, or regard for, the practices and 
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joined by judges who have taken senior status. Many of those 
judges continue to sit with their active colleagues with the result 
that their influence on the court persists.71
At the OSG level, an appeal or en banc review is more 
likely to be authorized if the US Attorney’s office, the DOJ 
Criminal Appellate lawyer, and the Assistant Solicitor General 
agree. Although the DOJ’s view may carry somewhat greater 
weight than the US Attorney’s does, neither recommendation 
controls. After the Assistant SG writes a third memorandum 
analyzing the pros and cons of an appeal, the US Attorney’s 
office is generally notified at least informally of that 
recommendation. All three memoranda are then reviewed by the 
Deputy SG in charge of criminal cases. A thirty-plus year 
veteran of the OSG, this Deputy has personally argued over 100 
cases before the Supreme Court and is functionally the decision-
maker with respect to criminal cases.72 If there is disagreement 
among the three parties (the US Attorney’s office, Criminal 
Appellate, and OSG), a telephone conference may be held in an 
effort to thrash out the differences and persuade the dissenter to 
yield. With or without such a conference, the Deputy SG makes 
his own recommendation. Occasionally, this fourth assessment 
is in the form of a formal memorandum. More often, however, 
the Deputy’s analysis is written by hand across the margins of 
the Assistant SG’s memorandum. Its seeming informality 
notwithstanding, this is no stream-of-consciousness musing. 
Instead, the handwritten analysis invariably goes to the core of 
the issue and ends with the bottom line: further action or none. 
significantly affect the cohesiveness, the continuity, and perhaps even the legitimacy of 
circuit court decision-making”). 
71. See, e.g., Ruggero J. Aldisert, A Nonagenarian Discusses Life as a Senior Circuit 
Judge, 14 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 183, 184 (2013) (reporting that senior circuit judges 
were “responsible for nearly one-fifth of the total participation in appeals considered by the 
federal courts of appeals across the country: 18.2 percent of those cases in 2008, 17.8 
percent in 2009, 21.6 percent in 2010, 21.7 percent in 2011, 20.4 percent in 2012, and 19.9 
percent in 2013”); Cooper & Berman, supra note 70, at 695 (pointing out that “where an 
appellate panel includes a senior judge from the panel’s own circuit, the panel’s 
functioning may be largely unaffected since the senior judge, by dint of experience, is 
likely familiar not only with circuit precedent and the formal local rules, but also with 
informal traditions and the personalities of the judges within the circuit”).  
72. In July 2017, Deputy Solicitor General Michael Dreeben joined the investigation by 
Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller III into possible coordination between President Donald 
J. Trump’s associates and Russian officials. As of this writing, however, he is continuing 
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Attached to the OSG’s memorandum with the handwritten 
commentary is a cover sheet on which the box “Appeal” or “No 
appeal” or “En Banc” or “No En Banc” is checked. Only if the 
“Appeal” or “En Banc” box is checked can the case proceed. 
V. DIFFERENCES OF PERSPECTIVE
There is substantial logic to confining to OSG the final 
authority to permit the United States to appeal or seek further 
appellate review. As the exclusive advocate for the United States 
before the Supreme Court in both civil and criminal cases, OSG 
has its finger on the pulse of legal trends around the country. 
That there is logic to that allocation of authority, however, does 
not mean that OSG, DOJ Criminal Appellate, and US Attorneys 
always share the same interests or perspectives. 
One difference is that line AUSAs generally, and a 
district’s appellate specialists especially, appear in their circuits 
regularly—some as often as one or more times each month. 
Appellate AUSAs in particular are both well known to the 
judges in their circuits and familiar with the judges’ individual 
personalities, orientations, judicial demeanor, alignments with 
other judges, and interests in particular issues. By contrast, 
lawyers from DOJ and OSG appear in the federal courts of 
appeals far less often. They generally assume responsibility for a 
criminal appeal only at the request of the US Attorney’s office, 
which may have inadequate recourses to handle a massive, time-
consuming appeal. Well-trained and capable advocates that they 
are, DOJ and OSG lawyers nonetheless lack the insiders’ 
familiarity with specific federal courts of appeals that can give 
an advocate an advantage. With respect to en banc proceedings, 
line AUSAs also often have a better feel as to which judges who 
did not sit with a panel are amenable to a different outcome and 
which judges are intractable. 
Another difference is in perspective. US Attorneys’ offices 
are largely focused on the specific problems within their 
districts. They may want to take an appeal or seek en banc 
review knowing they will lose simply because the crime is 
especially heinous, the case particularly notorious, or the injury 
to the victim in special need of vindication. In the instance of a 
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office may want to pursue every possible recourse simply 
because, apart from the time and effort of drafting another 
pleading, there is little left to lose. OSG has a more national—
sometimes seemingly abstract—view of issues. OSG’s concern 
can be more with the danger of creating bad precedent or 
threatening case authority that favors the United States than with 
the result in a particular case. Thus, OSG can be more reluctant 
to appeal than US Attorneys might like. 
A third difference is the relationship between a US 
Attorney’s office and the trial judges in that district. There will 
be times when a US Attorney’s office will want to appeal 
because a district judge has repeatedly misapplied some precept 
and only a decision from the court of appeals will stem the tide. 
Rather than authorize an appeal, however, Criminal Appellate or 
OSG may recommend alternative tactics: bringing a different set 
of charges against the same defendant or submitting revised jury 
instructions in future cases. There also may be times when 
disagreement arises because a particular US Attorney’s office 
has prevailed on a given issue either in the district court, the 
court of appeals, or both, but OSG decides as a matter of 
nationwide policy to confess error and consent to an order of the 
Supreme Court vacating and remanding the case to the district 
court.73 Line AUSAs, not lawyers from DOJ or OSG, must 
appear again before the court or courts in which they succeeded, 
and the judges whose decisions have been vacated and 
remanded with the Solicitor General’s consent may perceive the 
AUSA as having led them down the primrose path. But these 
awkward moments come with the territory; AUSAs know that 
they are inevitable in a process that involves so many layers of 
decisionmaking authority. Occasionally, line AUSAs will 
receive instructions from Washington to take a particular 
position in a pending case only to have that position be altered 
as a matter of DOJ policy. Reversing course while a case is still 
before any court can be very awkward for an AUSA, but this too 
is part of the job. 
73. In United States v. Russell, 728 F.3d 23 (1st Cir. 2013), both the district court and 
the First Circuit ruled in the Government’s favor, but after the Solicitor General confessed 
error, the judgment was vacated and the case remanded to the First Circuit. Russell v. 
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VI. AT THE SUPREME COURT
Although OSG is the exclusive advocate for the United 
States before the Supreme Court, the involvement of line 
AUSAs in a case does not end if certiorari is sought, opposed, or 
granted. Rather, as a matter of both courtesy and understanding 
the practical implications of an issue, OSG continues to consult 
with the line AUSA during any Supreme Court proceedings. 
Before certiorari petitions or oppositions to certiorari are filed, 
OSG lawyers send one or more drafts to the responsible line 
AUSA for comment. OSG lawyers may turn to their appellate 
contacts around the country to understand the impact of a given 
issue on federal criminal practice across the nation. If certiorari 
is granted, whether at OSG’s behest or over its opposition, the 
OSG brief undergoes numerous drafts and revisions and the 
responsible AUSA is commonly included in those discussions. 
Very often, the line AUSA participates in the moot court 
exercises that are held before the case is argued in the Supreme 
Court. Although never allowed to address the Supreme Court, 
the line AUSA is often invited to sit with the OSG lawyer during 
the oral argument and takes home the traditional souvenir of a 
Supreme Court appearance: one of the quill pens that are laid 
across each other at counsel table. The quill is a small, but 
tangible and meaningful reminder of a sometimes arduous 
process that can end with a chance to be present in the Supreme 
Court during oral argument—a peak experience in any lawyer’s 
career. 
